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Understanding China’s Transformations: 
The Dialectical Nexus between Internalities and Externalities  
 
 
Li Xing 
 
 
Introduction 
After China was united in 221 BC under the first emperor, Emperor Qin, his 
response to the external threat along the northern borders was to build a long 
wall of “civilizational division” – the Great Wall - along its northern borders in 
order to keep the “barbarians” outside the “land of civilization”. Until the arrival 
of European colonialists in the 19th century, China had been an autonomous, 
self-contained and self-assertive civilization. Historically Chinese used to 
perceive their civilization as the “middle kingdom” of the world surrounded by 
barbarians.  
 
China had traditionally been a land of empire in the length of unbroken history 
and cultural tradition, and Chinese devoted much of their energies to the 
sophistication of civil and cultural activities, and social organization. Despite the 
changes of imperial dynasties, the basic fabrics of Chinese civilization had been 
unchallenged until the 19th century. 
 
The West began to have a great curiosity and serious interest in the Far East 
after Marco Polo returned to Italy and brought back his image of China to 
Europe: the most powerful and wealthy country in the world ruled by stable and 
efficient elites. Since the Rome’s time, the flows of trade and commodities were 
overwhelmingly from the East to the West through the Silk Road. Although the 
West now takes special pride in its technological achievements, the original 
transmission of major new techniques was, until the recent past before the 
western industrial revolution, no less overwhelmingly from the East to the West 
(Segal, 1966: 318). The Western image of China had been indeed mysterious 
and promising.  
 
For a long period of time China had no interest in dealing with outsiders and it 
claimed to need nothing form the West. But Western countries wanted a great 
deal from China and their ambition was not only to urge their government to 
protect their trade but also to force a passage for their own products. Since the 
early 19th century the Chinese civilization when the well equilibrated Chinese 
imperial system was gradually challenged. Unlike the downfall of previous 
dynasties, which did not inflict any obvious damage to the way of Chinese life 
and the integration of Chinese culture, the decline of the last Manchus dynasty 
had the whole civilizational foundations weakened. The causes of the decline 
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were both multiple and complex. There were certainly a number of domestic 
socioeconomic factors as well as external forces which contributed to this state 
of affairs. 
 
China’s first war with the West, The Opium War (1840-1842), ended with its 
disgraceful defeat. The Treaty of Nanjing forced China to pay a huge indemnity 
to Britain for the compensation of the war and imposed China a tariff on all 
imported goods. The consequences were very damaging: traditional tributaries 
were taken away; concessions to foreign privileges were made; the authority of 
the emperor, upon which the Chinese order based, was ended; the hand-labor-
based industries on which Chinese economy depended were destroyed; and the 
favorable balance of trade, which existed until 1830 and which had brought an 
uninterrupted flow of silver from the outside, became lopsided (Kapur, 1987: 2). 
China became indeed an “international colony”. The traditional social structure 
was finally broken down. China’s customs and post offices were largely 
controlled by Westerners; Western ships were permitted to navigate freely in its 
water, and even to demolish some of its coastal defense; many Western troops 
were stationed at a number of points on a permanent basis; pieces of territory in 
various parts of the country were taken over as concessions. China was thus 
divided by Western powers as “spheres of interest” and was “carved up like a 
melon.”  
 
China in the late 19th and early 20th century was in a turbulent period of social 
disintegration, regional warlordism, popular revolution and political chaos. Very 
few societies like China had been so radically transformed in such a short time 
within the 20th century. Politically, the Chinese state and society transformed 
from a long imperial system to a short-lived republic, and then from a fragile 
and predatory warlordism to a revolutionary centralized socialist authoritarian 
state. Ideologically the Chinese value systems went through many “great leaps 
forward” from Confucianism to Marxism, from imperialism to republicanism, 
from feudalism to socialism and from collectivism to individualism. 
Economically China underwent a state-led socialist industrialization project 
based on planned economy and collective egalitarianism, and then moved to an 
all-round economic reform based on market mechanisms. The Chinese political 
and economic landscape had experienced repeated shifts from crisis and failure 
to very rapid growth and achievement.  
 
Objective and methodological consideration 
How can we comprehend and interpret these historical transformations shaped 
by fundamental changes? What are the internal driving forces and the external 
influences behind these transformations? And what are the consequential 
impacts when internal transformations were trigged by external thrust, and vice 
versa?   
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The objective of this paper is to offer a framework of understanding the 
dialectical nexus between China’s internal evolutions and the external influences 
with a focus on the century-long “challenge-response” dynamism. That is to 
explore how external factors helped shaping China’s internal transformations, 
i.e. how generations of Chinese have been struggling in responding to the 
external challenges and attempting to sinicize external political ideas in order to 
change China from within. Likewise, it is equally important to understand how 
China’s inner transformation contributed to reshaping the world. Each time, be it 
China’s dominance or decline, the capitalist world system has to adjust and 
readjust itself to the opportunities and constraints brought about by the “China 
factors”. The current rise of China is and will be arguably the most challenging 
event in the 21st century that has an impact on the “future of the West” 
(Ikenberry, 2008). 
 
Analytical propositions 
Methodologically, the paper’s analytical frameworks proposes an analysis of the 
fundamental changes in the socio-political components of the Chinese society 
brought about by drastic revolutionary transformations at different periods and 
their external reciprocal impact (see Figure 1): 
 
1) Before its collapse at the beginning of the 20th century China’s imperial 
system consisted of two poles of societal components: the imperial 
authority at the top and the family structure at the bottom. Ideologically, 
culturally and politically Confucianism contributed to moral and ethnical 
frameworks for the sustainability of this two-pole system. The references 
of cultural understanding and the production and reproduction of political 
and individual life were structured around this two-pole system which had 
been unchallenged for more than 2000 thousand years. Linguistically, the 
vocabulary of “civil society” (the third social force between the state and 
the market) does not exist in the Chinese language, and even today the 
Chinese translation of “civil society” cannot cover its actual notion and 
implications. 
2) Imperial China was less interested in the outside world, whereas the 
Western curiosity about China had never stopped. China’s defeat in the 
Opium War not only had such an impact on the nation’s psychological 
understanding of the “middle kingdom” as well as the Confucian 
teachings but also forced China to open its doors to external ideas and 
political thoughts. As a consequence of the China-West conflicts, the 
traditional equilibrium of the two-pole system began to be destabilized 
leading to several decades of disintegration and chaos. 
3) Through sinicizing Western Marxism with Chinese reality, the Chinese 
communists achieved the state power in 1949. The Chinese revolution cut 
the root of the “old China” and created a socialist “new China” 
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characterized by a historically unique experiment to skip over the stage of 
capitalism and to bring about a socialist transformation of both the social 
structure and the consciousness of its people in ways that defied 
conventional ideological and political norms in established capitalist as 
well as socialist states. Externally the “loss of China” had a shock effect 
to the US-based capitalist system and contributed to the political economy 
of the rise of East Asian authoritarian capitalism. 
4) The historical two-pole system was replaced by a new type of two-pole 
system represented by the party leadership at the top and class struggles at 
the bottom. The whole socialist period was characterized by state 
ownership, agricultural collectivism and welfare egalitarianism. However, 
such an endeavor of independent and self-reliance development 
alternative was severely constrained by the US-led capitalist world order. 
Chinese socialism had to adjust to both internal constraints and external 
pressures. Nevertheless, the overall achievements of socialism paved a 
solid material and infrastructural foundation to China’s comparative 
advantage in its post-Mao integration with the global economy. During 
the socialist period, red China’s attempt of “sinicizing socialism”, 
although seemingly threatening, did not impose any direct destructive 
impact on the capitalist world system. 
5) The post-Mao leadership undertook a modernization process through 
economic reforms aiming at sinicizing Western market capitalism with 
“Chinese characteristics” and through embracing market capitalism while 
incorporating China into the existing world system. China is now 
undergoing transformative changes through a series of processes of 
economic, institutional and ideological “passive revolutions”. Not only 
has the previous party-class system been replaced by a party-market 
system, but also has it successfully integrated with the capitalist world 
system. The sinicized “Chinese capitalism” or “Chinese market socialism” 
combining market mechanism with an active role of the party-state is 
unleashing direct “threatening” impact on the existing international order. 
Dialectically internal economic achievement and external dependence are 
two sides of the same coin creating both internal contradictions and 
external anxieties. 
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The classical China in the 19th century: emerging underdevelopment 
Between the early 19th century and the victory of the Communist revolution in 
1949, China exhibited the classic symptoms of backwardness: political 
corruption, social debility and class exploitation, economic stagnation, 
negligible technical change, and heavy demographic pressure. The reality China 
faced was a typical picture of political-economic underdevelopment by any 
standard.  
 
Then, the questions are: how had this come about? What were constraints that 
brought about China’s decline and underdevelopment? Were constraints mainly 
external or internal? The decline of the Chinese civilization and its 
underdevelopment has been a subject of interest in social science and especially 
in the field of development studies. Different schools of thought have tried to 
offer the explanations from different perspectives. 
 
In line with the classical Marxist conceptualization, which identifies East Asia 
societies with the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), the AMP goes that 
geographically, the landscape of the Chinese traditional communities was 
dependent on irrigation systems which required a centralized authority to 
coordinate and develop large-scale hydraulic works; politically, the Chinese 
state were stagnant societies dominated by a despotic state class with a 
centralized governance; and socioeconomically, the Chinese economic bases 
consisted of economically self-sufficient families and village communities 
combining agriculture and handicrafts. The sustainability of the system was built 
on loyalty to the state on the hand and filial piety to the family on the other, 
which made political patriarchy and patrimonialism possible. Under this type of 
socio-political organization, the middle space between the state and family 
became so narrow that it was not possible to expect China (or any other non-
Western historical society) to have had, or to have required, anything like the 
complex of attitudes, values, and institutions that are amalgamated and reified 
under the term “civil society”. 
 
The concept of the AMP endorses “the privileged position of Occidental over 
Oriental history: the dynamic and progressive character of the West versus the 
stationary and regressive features of the East (Bottomore, 1983: 33). It argues 
that the Oriental pre-capitalist economic formations together with their 
“primitive” societal forms and family- or clan-based social structures were 
unfavorable for the emergence of the “capitalist mode of production,” i.e. the 
existence of the Occidental feudalism in politically independent kingdoms and 
cities was crucial for the growth of the production of exchange values and for 
the rise of a bourgeois class and industrial capitalism. The primary hub of this 
conceptual approach focuses on the constraints of the internal economic 
organization. 
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Another school of thought which also emphasizes the internal factors is The 
state and social structure theory. It is an attempt by China-scholars to explain 
underdevelopment in China specifically from the perspectives of its internal 
factors in relation to a number of features of the Chinese state and social 
structure. It stresses the social structure symbolized by Chinese family system, a 
conservative bureaucracy and ruling ideology, a parasitic elite, fatalistic attitude, 
etc. as obstacles to modernization. The arguments of this theory suggest that the 
requirements of modernization were incompatible with the requirements of 
Confucian stability and hierarchy system (Lippit, 1980). Again, the conceptual 
framework of this school emphasizes the malfunctioning of the domestic socio-
political structure. 
 
The most challenging arguments come from the culturalist line of thinking. 
Hegel, for example, at a time when the Western consciousness of the world 
created revolutionary history, saw China in the “Childhood” of history (Engels 
in Dirlik & Meisner, 1989: 17); and Marx, whose theories and insight inspired 
the Chinese revolution, described China a society “vegetating in the teeth of 
time” and discovered in the Great Wall of China a metaphor for the universal 
resistance of non-European societies to change (Marx in Dirlik & Meisner, ibid.: 
17). Their views were understandable because these perceptions of China, 
although premature, were a product of a comparison between the immobility of 
non-Western cultures and the revolutionary Europe. What was behind the 
viewpoint was to establish a European model for other cultures to follow. To put 
China in the framework of the Weberian explanation, the failure of China’s 
transition to the stage of capitalism was due to the fact that Chinese Confucian 
cultural values were not receptive to the development of capitalism in terms of 
creativity, competition and development. Once again, the theoretical paradigm 
of this approach points to the limits of inner value systems. 
 
 
The revolutionary China: sinicizing Western Marxism 
Since China’s defeat in the Opium War and its final collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty, Chinese academics and elites were deeply divided in which direction 
China should move to. There were mainly four schools of attitude. The first 
school favored the restoration of traditional social structure, recovering the 
ancient power and expelling outsiders. The second school preferred a limited 
change, but was not interested in modern science and industry nor was it 
interested in learning Western political philosophy and economic system. Its 
only interest was Western weaponry technology and military training. The third 
school went to the opposite extreme. It favored total Westernization, and was 
convinced that science and technology did affect values. People belonging to 
this school believed that it was impossible to borrow Western technology while 
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maintaining Chinese ways of thinking and its outdated institutional structure. 
The most influential one was the fourth school - Marxism and Leninism.  
 
The historical role of Marxism-Leninism 
Confucian cultural and value system developed over several thousands of years 
under feudal systems, while Marxism emerged in a Europe context in the 18th 
century. They appear to be unrelated both in timing and content; nevertheless, 
history has brought the two together in China. 
 
The post-Opium War challenges to the Chinese nation were dual: China had not 
only to build a modern economy, but also to create a new culture and value 
system in order to shape the direction of national development. The requirement 
for forming a new cultural identity became a yardstick for generations of 
Chinese reformers and revolutionaries because new value system and attitude 
were preconditions for the transformation of individuals as well as the material 
base of society, and economic development and culture were intricately 
interconnected (Kung, 1975: 219). China indeed needed a new comprehensive 
philosophical base, a new framework of understanding - a new Confucianism, 
and that was why Western communism found its precise role in China.  
 
During this period different of schools of thoughts entered China including 
many foreign-inspired schools, such as Constitutionalism, Positivism, Marxism-
Leninism, Socialism, Liberalism, Darwinism, etc. It was during this period that 
the Marxist proletarian culture and class theory began to influence and inspire 
the worldviews of revolutionary Chinese people especially some intellectuals, 
among them Mao Zedong, who was one of the founders of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The CCP successfully linked the potential of the 
Chinese proletarian revolution to the worldwide proletarian movement and 
paved the way for the establishment of a populist tradition in the course of the 
national struggle for independence and prosperity. 
 
 
Marxism-Leninism opened the horizons of the Chinese progressive intellectuals 
and internationalized their conceptualization of China’s domestic problems. The 
Marxist-Leninist teachings of colonialism and imperialism provided China with 
a radical approach viewing underdevelopment as essentially an outcome of a 
historical process caused by western colonial-imperialist expansion. Marxism 
and especially Lenin’s theory of capitalist imperialism provided Chinese 
intellectuals with a partial theoretical framework as well as a psychological 
answer to their difficulties in finding the proper explanations and theories to the 
failures of traditional Chinese culture and for the humiliation suffered at the 
hands of the West (Peck, 1975: 73). It offered them a great source of inspiration 
to take positions and to analyze the world from different perspectives. China, as 
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they saw, was no longer an isolated center of globe surrounded by barbarians, 
but a part of the world full of different forces and ideas. Since the establishment 
of Chinese Communist Party in 1927, the Chinese impact on both transforming 
and strengthening Marxism-Leninism was equally important. The Chinese view 
on its role in the international affairs had changed from regarding itself as the 
center of the world and universal authority to seeing that China’s problem was 
part of the world problems and Chinese revolution was relevant for the outside 
world. 
 
Nevertheless, whatever political discourse might be more suitable to China, it 
was Mao who was able to combine both learning and statesmanship and 
combine Marxism-Leninism with China’s reality. He seized this opportunity to 
sinicize the Chinese Communist movement in terms of skilful redefinition of 
“class” and application of class politics1. Mao’s strategy of “using countryside to 
surround city” turned the Chinese revolution into a peasant-based and backward 
Chinese uprising. No matter how significant Western progressive theories were 
in influencing the Chinese revolution, without combining it to China’s reality by 
Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism would probably have aroused only a few 
rebels. Although communist historians maintain that it is “the people who create 
history” and reject the great-man theory of history, it is no doubt that without 
Mao’s contribution Chinese history would have run a different course (Chi, 
1986: 296). 
 
The “loss of China” and the rise of East Asian developmental states 
This “loss” of China to Communism had a tremendous impact on American 
society (Thomson, 1992). From the president and government officials down to 
the media and ordinary people, Americans simply could not understand how a 
hopeful Chinese Nationalist government with modern US military support could 
be defeated by a Communist-led insurrection. There might have been a chance 
after the Second World War and the Chinese communist victory, when an 
American government could have actually coexisted and developed normal 
relations with socialist China. But the US government immediately responded to 
the “loss” of China by military containment and isolation of Red China under 
the assumption that the containment of China could prevent the spread of 
revolution. For nearly a quarter of a century, the “loss of China” had a grave 
impact on America’s policies in Asia which were skewed by the fear of 
Communism, so were American politics, education, and society. This fear of 
Communism not only founded McCarthyism in the US politics but also made America 
take part in two perhaps entirely avoidable wars in Korean Peninsula and 
                                                          
1 Mao realized the power of hundreds of millions of peasants who could be converted to 
become part of the revolutionary army. The Chinese Revolution is in reality a peasant 
revolution rather than a working class one 
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Southeast Asia. And America-East Asia relations became engulfed by years of 
blind and lethal zealotry. The “loss of China” also attributed to the political 
economy of the rise of East Asian developmental states under the American 
parenthood (Hersh, 1993) 
Under the American protection, external military threats and the internal danger 
of communist expansion were substantially contained in these two regions. 
Through providing security, economic support and military aid to Japan and 
other East Asian states, the American goal was consequently to control and 
define their roles (including Germany in Europe) within the American-led 
alliance and prevent them from embarking upon an independent political and 
military course (Schwarz, 1996: 92-102)2. The burden of the allied countries’ 
military expenses was also greatly reduced by the American military presence. 
American military bases have been documented to have not only protected these 
countries but also provided them with economic benefits such as employment. 
Even now, the withdrawal of American military forces would be considered as a 
substantial economic loss. 
 
America’s long-term strategic interest in East Asia can be understood as having 
a dual objective: “watching” the role of Japan and “managing” the risk by the 
rise of China as a regional and global power. American role and presence in this 
region as a balance-of-power guarantor are generally welcome by the smaller 
nations. It is expected that in the foreseeable future the US will remain a key 
role player in this region’s integration process whether one like it or not. 
 
 
The socialist China: alternative experiment in a capitalist world system 
The history and trajectory of Chinese socialism 
According to some scholars that the reason why China was able to industrialize 
more rapidly since 1949 was that the Communist revolution “decisively broke 
the ties that chained China to the imperialist system” (Moulder 1977: viii-ix) and 
also broke free of a variety of complicated domestic confinements, such as 
localism, warlordism and foreign domination. However, like all socialist states, 
post-revolutionary China was still a constituent part of the “capitalist world 
system”3. Would China be able to form an autonomous entity interacting with 
the capitalist system while avoiding the vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the 
larger capitalist bloc? In other ways, would China be allowed to peacefully 
                                                          
2 It is recognized that the US post-war objective in East Asia, as a part of its global strategies, 
was to restore the functioning of the capitalist world system, which was fundamentally 
different from the fascist-militarist Japanese agenda during the Second World War. 
3 Socialist countries, in the view of the World System Theory, are “state capitalism” because 
the state is the key actor in the capital accumulation process. 
 
 43
develop an alternative model and an independent path to social and economic 
development? The answer, as proved by the history, is no. 
 
The ideas and ideologies of socialism can be traced back to some centuries ago, 
but worldwide socialist moments as a political force of global historical 
significance were relatively a recent phenomenon centered in the 20th century. 
Seen from a world system perspective, the historical evolutions of socialist and 
communist movements can be seen as part of long-run spiraling struggles 
between the expansion capitalism and the counter-reactions (Chase-Dunn, 
1999). This history of spiraling struggles between these two contending forces 
can be comparably referred to “double movements” in a Polanyian term 
(Polanyi, 1957). Socialism, seen as part of antisystemic or counter-hegemonic 
movements, necessitated the capitalist world to initiate a number of social, 
economic and political “passive revolutions” including the New Deal, 
Keynesianism and Fordism in order to regain its dynamic and resilient 
capacities. Between the period of the post-war and the end of Cold War it was 
popular then for Western governments to proclaim themselves to be Keynesian 
or Social Democratic, rejecting laissez-faire capitalism and favoring for a more 
regulated macro-economic system of controlled and rationalized production. 
 
The history and trajectory of socialist states in the 20th century indicates that 
worldwide socialist movements in the periphery and semi-periphery all initially 
attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism and establish an alternative 
mode of product, but they ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize national 
industrialization in order to catch up with advanced capitalist states in the core. 
Hence, seen from a world system perspective, socialist states were still situated 
within the interactions of the capitalist world economy, and their activities are 
very much constrained by the international system of the capitalist world 
economy (So and Chiu 1995:139-40). Socialist states, despite of some socialist 
feature, such as egalitarian distribution, employment security, comprehensive 
welfare provision, etc, nevertheless they were still an integral part of capitalist 
accumulation. The history of Chinese socialism proved to be no exception. 
 
It is necessary to point out that the setback of Chinese socialism must not be 
simply reduced to “utopianism” or domestic policy failures because, in addition 
to internal difficulties, Chinese socialism encountered severe external 
constraints such as imperialist hostility, economic embargoes, deprival of access 
to capital and technology, diplomatic isolation and military interventions from 
the capitalist world led by the US. China faced the severe external constraints 
from the Cold-War world order, which in many ways influenced the choices and 
strategies of its socialist experiments as well as the course they took. Even its 
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institutional set-ups were structured according to the need of survival in a war 
situation.4 
The legacy of Chinese socialism 
Before drawing any deterministic conclusions on the period of Maoist socialism, 
we have to keep in mind that what Deng’s China has been doing since the end of 
the 1970s is not “economic reconstruction” but “economic reform” aiming at 
correcting the “irrational” part of the earlier economic policies. Hence, it is 
historically incorrect to ignore the fact that the achievements Chinese socialism 
under political sovereignty and a major change in domestic class relations paved 
the foundation of the economic progress achieved in the post-Mao era. If we do 
not make a realistic assessment of China’s socialist development during Mao’s 
period when it developed from a backward agrarian society to a major industrial 
power in the 1970s, we will not be able to understand both the economic 
achievements and problems inherited from that era. The legacy of Chinese 
socialism can be obviously seen from the favorable position China had, when 
the economic reform started, in defining the terms and establishing parameters 
of interaction with the capitalist world order. As a China-scholar observes,  
 
it [China] was not entangled in a complex web of external economic 
constraints which limited its freedom of action or skewed its decision in the 
interests of foreign powers or corporations. ... the establishment of a strong, 
autonomous state provided the political precondition for ensuring – with a 
margin for miscalculation – that international economic ties were more likely 
to be beneficial, as classical economic theory and modern development 
economics have promised. 
 (White 1982: 131) 
 
The Maoist independent and non-alliance foreign policy, armed with concrete 
advance in certain industries and military technologies as mentioned before, and 
assisted by its strong ties with the developing world which backed China’s 
victorious re-entry into the United Nations as a permanent member of the 
Security Council, paved a solid foundation for its successful rapprochement with 
the United States. Consequently and not coincidently, the post-Mao regime was 
in a favorable position to negotiate political, economic and military relations 
with the outside world on a either relatively equal or advantageous basis.  
 
The success of the post-Mao market reform proves fact that the fundamental 
changes and achievements during the reform period in the 1980s and the 1990s 
were a clear indication of the contribution of the socialist development strategy 
                                                          
4  The organizational logics of Chinese institution (in Chinese “Dan Wei”) have their roots 
from the war periods (the anti-Japanese war and the civil war). It was a decentralized 
system in which each unit/institution is supposed to survive on its own in terms of 
production, reserve, welfare, medical care, etc. 
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rather than its failure. For example, it has been recognized that China’s village-
township enterprises had played an important role in its economic growth during 
the reform period. Township enterprises became, more than the state sectors, the 
most dynamic engine of China’s economic growth. According to the World 
Bank report, the growth and performance of China’s township and village 
enterprises (TVE) was extraordinary: their share in GDP rose from 13 per cent 
in 1985 to 31 per cent in 1994; their output grew by about 25 per cent a year 
since the mid-1980s; they now accounted for a third of total industrial growth in 
China; and for more than a decade TVEs had created 95 million jobs (World 
Bank 1996: 51).  
 
Conventional wisdom claims that the rapid development of village-township 
enterprises is only due to the reform-oriented leadership which came to power 
and ended the public ownership system, and unleashed their enormous potential 
of entrepreneurship. While such a view contains elements of truth, it is not 
historically correct and can be seriously misleading.  
 
What we must not forget is that the rise of TVEs was not a product of the reform 
policy; rather, it is the direct result of the socialist mass-line mobilization 
development strategy to push forward rural industrialization aiming at making 
rural areas into affiliations of industrialization processes alongside major 
industrial cities. What was behind the socialist economic policy, albeit it was 
radical, was the standpoint that Chinese peasants would ultimately bear the 
burden of industrial investment in one way or another; and instead of over-
taxing them and widening the rural/urban gap, they could be helped to develop 
rural industries along with urban industrialization. The essential goal of the 
Maoist rural development policy was to create a simultaneous process in which 
collectivization went hand-in-hand with industrialization.  
 
Therefore, TVEs were the outcomes emerged during the “Great Leap Forward” 
and the Cultural Revolution. Village-township enterprises are direct 
‘descendants’ of those previously owned by communes and brigades (Putterman 
1997). It was a gradual process based on a number of innovative ideas such as 
factory and commune linkage, young intellectual going to the countryside, 
cadres and technicians working in grass roots units, and linkage between 
industry and agriculture, etc. About 28 million people were employed in 
commune and brigade factories out of a total labor force of about 300 million 
(Lippit 1982: 128). In 1958, 85 per cent of the 1,165 enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of the central state were transferred to local administrations; and 
within one year there were about 6 million small-scale industries: coal, power 
station, cement, fertilizer, agricultural machinery and processing enterprises 
(Gao 1997).  
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The socialist foundation for China’s economic emergence 
As it is well known, the success story of Japan and the rapid economic 
development of some Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) were largely 
based on export-oriented strategy. It is widely recognized that the engine of 
economic growth in the East Asian model of development was attributable to the 
rapid growth of exports. Beginning in the 1960s, favorable conditions created 
opportunities for relatively low-cost industrial production to be integrated into 
the world economy through increased relocation of production by multinational 
corporations to low-wage sites. China was obviously denied access to all these 
benefits and was thus excluded from taking advantage of the favorable 
international development conditions during the upward phase of the world 
economy. Neither was China unable to pursue a development strategy based on 
export-oriented industrialization even if it had so desired, nor was it able to 
adopt the import-substitution option due to the economic sanctions and embargo 
imposed upon it. 
 
Ironically and not coincidentally, the rapid economic advance of China in the 
post-Mao decades is actually because of the “regaining” of these favorable 
international conditions. Furthermore, dialectically, because of the international 
isolation leading to the alternative choice of self-reliance and self-sufficiency 
Chinese socialism, it was possible for China to confine the external impact of 
distortion at a limited level. Due to the socialist legacy, “China also stands out as 
the only developing country without any internal or external debts outstanding 
and a uniquely stable currency.” (Bhattacharya in Bergmann, 1977: 228) 
 
In a nutshell, the economic success and comparative advantages generated 
during the decades of Chinese socialist experiment laid a solid foundation and 
paved the way for Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy in integrating the Chinese 
economy with the world market. However, the latter course was not 
predetermined. The socialist achievements made China relatively stronger and 
equal in world market exchanges. The present contradiction between China and 
the west, especially the US, is that the latter wants to make sure that China 
competes in the world market according to the “established rules” because its 
comparative advantages could be used to break these rules. Therefore, it is 
ahistorical to stress the present success without giving a proper assessment of 
the contribution of the socialist achievements. 
 
 
The capitalist China: challenges and opportunities in the capitalist world 
system 
China’s rejoining the capitalist world after restoring diplomatic relations with 
the United States and especially after it started the economic reform since the 
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end of 1970s was regarded as the biggest savoir to the capitalist world order 
because the core parts of the capitalist world system - the United States and 
Europe - were also much weakened by the long Cold-War competition with the 
former Soviet Union.  
 
If the Maoist self-reliance and self-sufficient path of development was projected 
as a potential development model and ideology and the central goal of socialist 
politics was seen to challenge the unequal hierarchy in the world economic 
system, such a socialist hegemonic project, although threatening, existed more 
or less outside the US-led capitalist world system. In other words, it was more 
an ideological challenge without being able to construct an alternative world 
system to replace the capitalist world system. But ironically, the post-Mao 
economic marketization together with its political authoritarianism is also 
beginning to be viewed as a menace because of its ambition to have access to a 
larger share of world wealth, resources, and its responsibility in creating 
environmental problems as well as resisting American political demands. More 
importantly, such a “menace” exists within the mechanism of global capitalism! 
And it can be summarized in the following areas: 
 
The global “China factors” 
China’s high economic growth of three decades has already made its economic 
impact felt worldwide. China’s size and integration with the world economy 
have contributed to uncertainty about the global inflationary environment; its 
currency has been a subject of contention; its trade has raised concerns for 
workers and firms in both developed and developing countries; its hunger for 
energy has led to competition and conflict; it has rivaled the United States and 
the rest developing countries as a destination for foreign direct investment; and 
the effects of its own overseas investments have begun to be felt across the 
world; Beijing’s policies on finance, currency, trade, military security, 
environment issues, resource management, food security, raw material and 
product prices are increasingly seen as connecting with the economies of 
millions of people outside China’s boundary because China’s shifts in supply 
and demand cause changes in prices hence leading to adjustment in other 
countries. As a result, China is increasingly seen as having the quality of the 
previous US as an “indispensable country” (Feffer, 2007). China has generated 
incremental growth in the global economy that has made its success significant 
for the welfare of other countries. The global “China factors” can be 
summarized in the following areas: 
 
1)  Research and development 
China is rapidly developing as a more sophisticated industrial power. According 
to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
mainly due to growing international investment, China recently surpassed Japan 
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and became the world’s second largest spender on research and development 
(International Herald Tribune, Business Section, December 4, 2006). China has 
also overtaken Germany as the fifth most prolific nation in filing patents for new 
processes and technologies. Although its overall capacity for technological 
innovation still lags behind industrially advanced countries, these figures 
demonstrate that China is rapidly catching up.  
 
2)  Two-track FDI 
China has in the recent years become a magnet for global foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Especially in 2002, China replaced the United States as the 
world’s number one destination for FDI, nearly $53 billion. The dramatic 
inflows of foreign investment come due to China’s progress on structural 
reforms, its accession to the World Trade Organization as well as its continuous 
effort in bringing regulations in line with international standards. China is to aim 
at developing a more transparent business environment with a clear legal and 
regulatory framework, which will help attract higher-quality investments that are 
focused on long-term, high-technology, capital-intensive projects. 
 
In terms of China’s outflow FDI to the developing world, Beijing has developed 
strategic plans on how to provide aid without following the colonial model of 
economic relations and without following the suit of Western condition-based 
practices. Most FDI to developing countries such as Africa are placed in the 
extractive mineral and primary economy sector, whilst China’s FDI targets 
mainly at the manufacturing sectors in developing economies of Africa, Latin 
America and Asia. China does not tie aid to policy preference by those who 
receive its assistance, which is seen as a great challenge to the conventional 
ideologies and practices of Western donors. 
 
3)  Natural resource and commodity price 
Metal prices have increased sharply due to strong demand, particularly from 
China which has contributed 50 percent to the increase in world consumption of 
the main metals (aluminum, copper, and steel) in recent years. Due to its rapid 
growth and rising share in the world economy, China is expected to retain its 
critical role in driving commodity market prices (World Economic Outlook, 
September 2006). China offers above world market prices for buying raw 
materials, which attributes great comparative advantages to the developing 
world.  
 
China has always sought to maintain self-sufficiency in the production of basic 
food products for its entire population. However, following the rising living 
standards, it is forecasted China’s demand for grains, meat and oilseeds will be 
gradually outpacing its ability to produce them. China has already become the 
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world’s largest soybean importer and is expected to become a significant grain 
importer as well, with profound impacts on global commodity prices. 
It is foreseeable that in the near future China’s import of natural resources 
especially oil and gas will have to be substantially increased. The implication is 
seemingly clear that not only the global commodity price and international 
geopolitical power relations will be affected but also China’s own internal 
evolutions, such as foreign policy thinking, foreign aid designing, arms sale 
consideration and compulsory expansion of its long-range naval power 
projection capabilities will be closely connected. 
 
4) International trade  
Nowadays Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage is being questioned as 
never before. China is currently the world’s third-largest trading nation and it 
will soon be the second in the coming years. The rapid rise of China as a major 
actor in the global economy is provoking a controversial debate about whether 
free trade is still in America’s interest. China’s rapid rise is feeding a common 
fear in the West: developing nations led by China and India may out-compete 
the western powers for high-tech jobs while keeping the low-skill, labor-
intensive manufacturing jobs they won already. The fear is that China might 
soon gain comparative advantages of labor, capital and even technology that will 
allow it to dominate the world economy. According to the IMF studies, a strong 
tendency is shown that China is moving out of labor-intensive manufacturing 
such as textiles, apparel, footwear, toys, etc, and beginning to increase its share 
of technology-intensive products, such as machines, electrical machinery, 
telecommunications, together with increasing degree of specialization (Amiti 
and Freund, 2007:39-40) 
 
The US trade deficit with China reached a new record of $230 billion. The 
American and Chinese ruling elites have no progressive means for resolving 
these massive economic imbalances. Beijing needs to keep foreign capital 
flowing in and exports expanding, in order to create millions of jobs to maintain 
social stability. The US economy requires the supply of $2 billion a day from 
the rest of the world, especially from Asian central banks, to finance its massive 
trade deficits. If this process continues indefinitely, the financial system must 
collapse at some point with incalculable consequences for the world economy. 
 
5) An emerging global creditor 
China used to be proud of being one of the largest recipients of FDI. Although in 
comparative terms China’s overseas investment is still small, the situation is 
changing considerably: China’s foreign currency reserves surpassed the $1.5 
trillion last year; and according to the official statistics, “China’s net overseas 
investment hit $21.16 billion in 2006, with an annual average growth rate of 60 
percent over the past five years” (China Daily, Oct. 2, 2007). 
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Recently, China’s state Sovereign Wealth Fund has attracted the global 
attention. China Investment Corp (CIC), a state-owned investment company 
with $200 billion of assets. In early this year during his visit to China the UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown openly offered London as an overseas base for 
China’s sovereign wealth fund, aiming to get a share of Beijing’s overseas 
invests in Britain. However, due to the state ownership of the fund, suspicions 
and worries about China’s economic agenda and geopolitical motivations can be 
revealed by some headlines like “China Sovereign Wealth Fund Could Buy 
Every US Company” (Bonner, 2007), and “Sovereign Wealth Funds: China’s 
Potent Economic Weapon” (Navarro, 2008). 
 
6) International relations 
China’s rise to the status of a world power is leading to some profound changes 
in the world system. The Chinese “indispensable” roles in influencing 
international politics and national policies are globally recognized: its active 
leadership in the 6-party talks in preventing North Korea from developing its 
nuclear program; its new approaches and policies to development assistance to 
the African continent are welcomed by most African nations and the 
representatives of 48 Africa nations gathered last fall in Beijing and expressed a 
new hope that Chinese investments in the continent will bring about their 
economic development. China’s growing influence in Africa and in other 
developing countries under the Five-Principles approaches to international 
relations specially to development assistance and aid to in which Beijing’s 
adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and its 
determination not to impose conditionality is challenging the Western especially 
the EU’s ideology-based policies. In East Asia, the region since the 1990s has 
witnessed a gradual shift away from the vertical Japan-led “flying-geese” model 
of regional development to a new horizontal China-driven regional economic 
integration (Li, 2007a).  
 
China’s enlarging involvement in the relationship with Latin America, its new 
activism at the United Nations, its representative voice in the WTO for the 
developing world, and its close relations with the World Bank, and its efforts in 
promoting regional multilateralism through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in central Asia, indicates China’s global presence. Even for the 
China-US relations, which are the world’s most difficult and complicated 
relations, the Bush administration will readily admit that China’s purchase of 
American bonds is indispensable in keeping the U.S. economy afloat despite of 
the fact that American politicians tend to demonize China’s large trade surplus 
and Beijing’s reluctance to liberalize its financial sector.  
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The impact of China’s challenges 
To some scholars the rise of China can be termed to be “Beijing Consensus” 
(Ramo, 2004 and Li, 2007b), a notion coined with distinct attitudes to politics, 
development and the global balance of power; to others it can simply be called 
the “Chinese model”, a sinicized market capitalism called “a socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics” implying an active role of the Chinese 
party-state in attaining macro-policy independence and socio-political stability. 
Both the “Beijing Consensus” and the “Chinese model” are being interpreted 
either as the rise of China’s soft power (Nye, 2005) or as a serious challenge to 
the existing economic theories (Chow, 1997) as well as to international relation 
theories (Paltiel, 2005). Will we witness the emergence of “Chinese 
international relations theories” in the near future along with the great economic 
and social transformation? The answer is both likely and even inevitable (Qin, 
2007). 
What is the implication of the rise of China to interest of the Western World at 
large and the United States in particular? Will a rising China be willing to be 
constrained by the established rules of games set up and defined by the post-war 
world order? Or will it alter the rules or write its own rules in many areas, such 
as intellectual property rights, trade practices, state-market relations, military 
expansion, and inter-state relations? Opinion-makers of both realists and 
neoliberals provide very different analyses and policy recommendations in 
response to the rise of China. Realists stress the importance of understanding the 
world system as zero-sum game advocating prevention against the “coming 
conflict with China” (Bernstein and Munro, 1997 and Mearsheimer, 2001 and 
2006). Whereas, neoliberals emphasize strength of an institutional approach to 
engage China so that it will be incorporated in international regimes and 
becoming a stake-holder in the existing global system (Ikenberry, 2008). 
 
In the past decades either fascination or irritation with China has always 
influenced Western scholarship and journalism, which often produce abrupt 
sentiment from excessive approval and unqualified optimism to unwarranted 
revulsion and deep pessimism. There were hopeful writings of confidence about 
China’s “second revolution” in the most of 1980s; then there was deep 
antagonism toward China’s lack of political reform following the June 1989 
crackdown; and in recent years, there are exaggerated projections of China’s 
threatening rise to the superpower status. From time to time Western politicians 
and observers selectively use China’s successes and failures to justify their 
existing theories and prejudices. A correct reading of the anxieties and 
contractions connected with the rise of China must be found in the 
understanding of a dialectical process of “mutual generation” and “mutual 
destruction” between domestic transformations and international premises. 
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A dual pressure on the capitalist world system 
Internally China has dramatically transformed itself from being an agrarian 
society to becoming the “world factory” and within a short period China has 
experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization which the West has gone 
through for about 200 years. Consequently China’s class components of the 
population will be fundamentally transformed in such a way that the share of its 
proletarian and semi-proletarian wage workers will increase substantially, and in 
the foreseeable future China’s degree of proletarianization and wage level will 
be equivalent to the current levels of the semi-peripheral states in Latin America 
and Southeast Asia (Li, 2005:435). Here, the “China threat” could come from 
purely domestic destabilizing effects of economic marketization: massive social 
dislocations stemming from the, rising unemployment, energy shortage, and 
widespread protest over widening inequalities, environmental degradations, 
mass migrations, ethnic tensions, minority separatism, and etc. Some of these 
are of serious concern of both internal sustainability and global security. The 
social cost of the contradiction of China’s transformation is hugely high (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett, 2004). 
 
The concerned scenario of China’s internal collapse portraits a threatening 
situation that if China suffered a Soviet type of sudden-death syndrome and 
spinned out of control, the whole world would face the worse nightmare – the 
return of pre-revolution China: a failed and predatory state surrounded by 
warlordism, civil war, crime, in addition to the modern China’s problems which 
are impossible for the world to deal with: huge refuge problem and proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
 
Externally China’s competitive advantages are weakening the relative monopoly 
of the existing semiperipheral states in certain commodity chains exerting 
pressures on their production cost and wage level (Li, 2005). The danger of 
peripheralization of the semiperiphery in the current capitalist world system is 
analytically theorized by a scholar: 
 
This has dangerous implications for the capitalist world economy. The semi-
periphery plays the indispensable role of the “middle stratum” in the world 
system. A layer of the semi-periphery offers hope of “modernization,” 
“development,” and ultimately, upward mobility for the great majority living 
in the peripheral states. Should this layer disappear and be reduced to no more 
than a part of the periphery, the world system is likely to become politically 
highly unstable. 
 
Peripheralization of the semi-periphery would deprive the capitalist world-
economy of a major source of effective demand. Moreover, the peripheralized 
semi-peripheral states will inevitably face highly explosive political situations 
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at home. The relatively more proletarianized working classes will demand 
semi-peripheral levels of wages and political and social rights. However, the 
peripheralized semi-peripheral states will not be able to simultaneously offer 
the relatively high wages and survive the competition against other peripheral 
or peripheralized semi-peripheral states in the world market. The entire semi-
periphery will be threatened with revolution and political turmoil. 
(Li, 2005: 436-437) 
 
It is unavoidable that China’s capitalist growth strategy has generated regional 
and global contractions. China is being associated to the cause of the problems 
of other countries and other regions: overproduction, decreasing regional wage 
rates, destructive regional competition for investment and resource, etc. (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The paper attempts to construct a framework of understanding the dialectical 
nexus between the internalities and externalities behind China transformations. 
Such an internal-external linkage intertwined with challenge-response 
paradigms has a dialectical process of mutual generation: internal struggles were 
triggered by external challenges while internal transformations were responded 
by external adjustments and accommodations. China’s century-long internal 
struggles to overcome constraints on its development can be equally paralleled 
by the continuous external responses to the “China factors”. China’s ability to 
successfully solve its internal development problems and manage external 
challenges will not only influence it internal stability, economic and political 
liberalization, and leadership but also affect regional and global security.   
 
Historically China has been able to display a capacity of absorbing foreign ideas 
and influences as well as sinicizing and transforming them into part of native 
value systems, such as the sinicization of Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism. 
Today it is still a question whether China is attempting to sinicize capitalism and 
create a “socialist market economy”. In recent decades economic growth has 
torn down much of the physical symbols of China’s cultural history, but Chinese 
people still remain an intensely historical nation with strong and popular 
nationalism. Chinese nationalism is an integral part of the internalities of the 
driving forces which can be turned into strong anti-west sentiment if the West 
refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China. The time when 
nationalism was mainly led by the party and the state, today nationalists, assisted 
by modern technology and economic prosperity, are acting independently 
beyond the control of the state (Gries, 2005). 
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Currently we witnessing an interesting dialectical situation China is facing: due 
to its embeddedness in the global capitalist system Beijing is gaining economic 
strength on the one hand but losing traditional political independence on the 
other. In other words, China’s rise through active participation in the global 
political economy is, at the same time, translating into greater vulnerability and 
dependence (Economy, 1998). Beijing’s desire to retain its legitimacy through 
integrating China’s economy with global capitalism will make it politically 
vulnerable to internal economic setbacks and external pressures, thus 
endangering the preservation of its integration. Today China again finds itself to 
be a “middle kingdom” surrounded by jealousy, admiration, anxiety, worry and 
even resentment. The West must understand the political inevitability, cultural 
requirement and social necessity that China’s adaptive sinicization is of vital 
importance. 
 
Historically China, ever since its first contact with West, has been seen as a 
nation of puzzle, mystery and unfathomably beyond comprehension. Even now 
when China has become an integral part of the capitalist world economy, China 
is still a country that the West finds it difficult to understand. To many western 
politicians and opinion-makers China simply does not conform to some most 
basic beliefs in the West about what makes nations grow and about a set of 
mutually dependent relationship between property rights and economic growth, 
between the rule of law and market economy, between free currency flow and 
economic order, and most importantly between political system and popular 
sentiment (Zakaria, 2007). As a well-known historian put it clearly “the most 
salient characteristic of international relations during the last century was the 
inability of the rich, established powers - Great Britain and the United States - to 
adjust peacefully to the emergence of new centres of power in Germany, Japan 
and Russia” (Johnson, 2005, online). 
 
Within the near future both China and the West will have to find a regional and 
global role which the other will accept and support. In order to do so both will 
have to go through a considerable period of struggle, adjustment and tension. It 
is still too early to predict whether the eventual outcome is a world disorder, 
reorder or new order. 
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